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1996.
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JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to section 78-2a-3(2)(j) of the
Utah Code Annotated (1996). The Utah Supreme Court transferred this case to the Utah
Court of Appeals by an order dated April 27, 2001.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW1
1.

Davis County brought this condemnation action knowing of the interveners'

interest in the property to be condemned, yet Davis County did not make the interveners
parties to the action but required them to file a motion to intervene. Under the
circumstances, did the trial court commit reversible error in holding that the date of
valuation as to the interveners was the date they were made parties to the action?
Standard of Review: In determining whether a valuation date fixed by statute
would result in unjust compensation, a court must consider various factors. Utah State
Rd. Comm 'n v. Friberg, 687 P.2d 821, 830 (Utah 1984) (per Stewart, J., with Durham, J.,
concurring and Oaks, J., concurring in the result). A trial court's decision requiring a
balancing of factors is reviewed for abuse of discretion or "reasonability." State v.
Horton, 848 P.2d 708, 713 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993). The
appellate court will presume that the trial court's discretion was properly exercised unless
1

The appellant's statement of the issues does not comply with Utah Rule of
Appellate Procedure 24(a)(5) in that it does not show where the issue was raised below.
Nevertheless, unless otherwise noted infra, the appellees do not dispute that the issues on
appeal were raised below.
1

the record clearly shows to the contrary. State v. Morgan, 813 P.2d 1207, 1210 n.4 (Utah
Ct. App. 1991) (citation omitted).
2.

The trial court refused to consider an affidavit from the Davis County

attorney submitted after the hearing on Davis County's motion for a new trial, which
contained inadmissible evidence and did not change the facts on which the trial court
based its ruling. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by not considering the untimely
affidavit?
Standard of Review: A trial court's selection, interpretation and application of a
specific evidentiary standard are reviewed for correctness, but its ultimate determination
on the admissibility of evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Jensen v.
Intermountain Power Agency, 1999 UT 10, f 12, 977 P.2d 474; State v. Jacques, 924
P.2d 898, 900 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
3.

Throughout this case, Davis County took the position that the defendants'

property was not being condemned for the Farmington Preserve development but for a
flood detention basin, and the evidence at trial showed that Farmington Preserve could be
developed without condemning the defendants' property. The defendants' valuation
expert based his appraisal in part on sales of adjoining properties in the Farmington
Preserve. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in admitting the appraisal of the
defendants' expert?

2

Standard of Review: The competency, relevancy, and similarity of other sales are
matters committed to the trial court's sound discretion, and the trial court's admission of
evidence of sales will not be reversed except for a clear abuse of discretion. See, e.g.,
City of Tucson v. Ruelas, 508 P.2d 1174, 1176 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1973); Board of County
Comm 'rs of Garfield County v. Tenbrook, 491 P.2d 597, 599 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971);
Nystrom v. State, 119 N.W.2d 123, 125 (S.D. 1962). See also Stevensen v. Goodson, 924
P.2d 339, 347 (Utah 1996) (the trial court is allowed considerable discretion in the
admissibility of expert testimony) (citations omitted); Griffith v. Griffith, 959 P.2d 1015,
1018 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) ("We will not reverse a trial court's determination on the
admissibility of evidence absent an abuse of discretion impacting a party's substantive
rights"), affd, 985 P.2d 255, 1999 UT 78.
4.

In his opening statement, Davis County's attorney suggested to the jury that

the condemnation award would be paid by tax dollars. The defendants objected on the
grounds that Davis County was not paying for the condemnation—the developer was.
Later, the agreement between Davis County and the developer, by which the developer
agreed to pay for the condemnation, came into evidence without objection. Did the trial
court commit reversible error by admitting this evidence?
Standard of Review: Although a trial court's selection, interpretation and
application of a specific evidentiary standard are reviewed for correctness, its ultimate

3

determination of the admissibility of evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
Griffith, 959 P.2d at 1018; Jacques, 924 P.2d at 900.
5.

Utah's eminent domain statute provides for prejudgment interest from the

date of taking actual possession of the property or the date of the order of occupancy,
whichever is earlier. An order of occupancy was entered on October 31,1997. The trial
court allowed prejudgment interest from that date. Did the trial court err in allowing
prejudgment interest from the date of the order of occupancy?
Standard of Review: A trial court's decision on entitlement to prejudgment
interest presents a question of law reviewed for correctness. Bailey-Allen Co. v. Kurzet,
876 P.2d 421,427 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES OR RULES
Sections 78-34-6(2) and -11 of the Utah Code are relevant to the first issue. Utah
Rule of Civil Procedure 59(c) is determinative of the second issue. Section 78-34-9(5)(c)
of the Utah Code is determinative of the fifth issue. These statutes and rule are set forth
in the addendum.

4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Court
Below.2
This is a condemnation action. Davis County brought this action against Zions

First National Bank, Trustee of the Max Kerr Trust Dated November 26, 1996, to
condemn 14.75 acres of choice undeveloped commercial property owned by the trust (the
"Kerr property"). (R. 1.) Tod B. Jones and Paul E. Barker claimed an interest in the
property under a real estate purchase contract. (R. 87-94.) Even though Davis County
knew Jones and Barker claimed an interest in the property, it chose not to name them as
defendants but required them to intervene in the action. (See R. 1; 83; 198; 1195, at 3.)
The court granted Jones and Barker the right to intervene on August 13, 1998. (R. 116.)
After various pretrial motions and rulings, the case was tried to a jury over three days, and
the jury returned a verdict setting the fair market value of the property as of August 13,
1998, at $1,606,500 (R. 908), the amount at which the defendants' expert appraiser had

2

The appellant's statement of the case is not supported by citations to the
record, as required by Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(7), and in fact misstates
the record. For example, Davis County claims that Zions' answer to the complaint
"stated as fact that it was the only party with any cognizable interest in the Kerr Property'
and that Zions "did not contest Davis County's entitlement to condemn." (Br. of Aplt. at
4.) In fact, all Zions admitted in its answer was that Davis County's records identified it
as the record owner of the property (R. 1-2, f 2; 26, % 2), and Zions vigorously disputed
Davis County's entitlement to condemn the property (R. 20-22, 26-27, 30-35). Davis
County later admits as much. (Br. of Aplt. at 6.) Moreover, the case was not "set down
for trial on the issue of Just Compensation to be measured as of... September 3, 1997,"
as Davis County claims. (Br. of Aplt. at 4.) The trial court's order did not specify the
valuation date. (See R. 64-65.)
5

appraised the property. The trial court denied Davis County's motion for a new trial (R.
1078) and its motion to reconsider that ruling (R. 1178). This appeal followed.

B.

Statement of Facts
In about 1990, Max Kerr bought 14.75 acres of prime, undeveloped commercial

property in Farmington City as an investment to provide for himself and his family. (R.
1200, at 26-27.)3 The property lies in a highly desirable location between the state's two
main highways, 1-15 and U.S. 89. It is north of the junction of 1-15 and U.S. 89 and south
of Shepherd Lane and the Oakcrest Country Club. (See ex. D73, at 13.) When Mr. Kerr
bought the property, there was relatively little development in the area, but in the early
1990s, a K-Mart was built on the northwest comer of Shepherd Lane and U.S. 89, and
over the years, development extended south towards the Kerr property. (See ex. D73, at
15; R. 1200, at 29-30; R. 1201, at 226-30; exs. D4ax, D5ax, D4bx, D5bx.) At the time of
condemnation, the area was "very vibrant" in terms of development. (R. 1201, at 226.)
In its physical characteristics, the Kerr property was essentially the same as all the
other properties in the area. (See, e.g., R. 1200, at 28, 97-98; R. 1201, at 316, 387, 397.)
All of the properties were flat, undeveloped meadows with some wetlands. (See ex. D73,

3

In late 1996, after Mr. Kerr had a stroke, the property was placed in trust,
with Zions First National Bank as trustee. (See R. 1200, at 32.)
6

at 18-19; R. 1200, at 97; R. 1201, at 336, 338.)4 However, the Kerr property had some
advantages that the surrounding properties did not have. The Kerr property was zoned
mostly BP (for "business park"). The BP zoning allowed such commercial uses as
general office and business park development-higher density and hence more favorable
uses than were allowed on the surrounding properties, which were zoned mostly
residential and agricultural. (See ex. D73, at 20-21 & 46A (zoning map); ex. D13X; R.
1200, at 27-29; R. 1201, at 235-36, 389.) The Kerr property also had frontage along 1-15,
which provided excellent visibility for commercial development. (R. 1200, at 29; R.
1201, at 223, 235.) The area had great accessability in terms of freeway access. (R.
1201, at 223.) Besides being between two main transportation arteries, it was near a hub
of the proposed Legacy Highway. (R. 1201, at 226, 230.) Finally, the Kerr property
already had in place a sewer system that could support residential development. (R.
1200, at 27-29, 54-55; R. 1201, at 236, 345-46; ex. D7x.)

4

Davis County's description of the property as "soggy bottom land" (Br. of
Aplt. at 6) and its implication that the nature of the property made it undevelopable were
not supported by the evidence at trial. The county's own appraiser described the Kenproperty as "essentially a tabletop." (R. 1201, at 337.) Before other properties in the area
were developed, the wetlands were fairly evenly distributed among all the properties in
the area. (See ex. D20ax; R. 1200, at 31, 58, 98, 136; R. 1201, at 388.) In fact, the
undisputed evidence at trial was that development of the Kerr property would have less
impact on wetlands than development of the adjacent properties. (R. 1200, at 138, 145;
R. 1201, at 253.) Thus, the wetlands on the Kerr property did not preclude development
any more than did the wetlands on the adjacent properties, including those that were
developed into the Farmington Preserve. (See R. 1200, at 136, 145, 166, 176; R. 1201, at
238-39.)
7

The Kerr property could be accessed from 1100 West on the north, which stubbed
in to the Kerr property, and by Burke Lane on the south. (R. 1201, at 239-43, 270, 338.)
The property had adequate access for development. (R. 1201, at 248.)
The Kerr property also had some disadvantages. For example, there were pipeline
easements on the property. (R. 1200, at 59.) However, the only testimony at trial was
that the pipeline did not preclude development but could be designed around. (R. 1200, at
110, 132; R. 1201, at 250-51, 374.)5
In short, it was undisputed at trial that the Kerr property could be developed. (See,
e.g., R. 1200, at 105-07, 110-11, 143, 152, 176; R. 1202, at 452.)
Beginning in 1996, a developer, Prows, Becknell & Alles, L.L.C. ("Prows"),
began acquiring properties in the area. In October 1996, Prows entered into a contract
with Farmington City called the Master Development Agreement, which provided for the
development of some 124 acres adjacent to the Kerr property. (Ex. Dl.) The
development was to include commercial, office and residential uses as well as an
enhanced wetland and ecological preserve. (Ex. Dl, at 2, \ D.) The Master Development
Agreement provided in effect that Prows would mitigate its wetlands in part by
5

Davis County also suggests that the Kerr property was subject to "periodic
flooding." (Br. of Aplt. at 7, 8.) However, it never flooded in the time the Kerrs owned
the property (PL 1200, at 31, 57-58), and it was no more subject to flooding than any of
the other properties in the area (R. 1201, at 398-99). It was not in a flood zone (R. 1200,
at 134; R. 1201, at 345), and the risk of flooding on the property was rated "minimal" (ex.
D73, at 19). Federal flood insurance would not have been required to develop the
property. (R. 1200, at 134.) Davis County's appraiser admitted at trial that the risk of
flooding could not be considered in valuing the property. (R. 1201, at 398-99.)
8

channeling them onto property Davis County was to acquire for a flood detention basin,
including the Kerr property. {See ex. Dl, at 17-19; R. 1200, at 36-38; R. 1201, at 253,
319,389.)
In January 1997 Prows entered into a contract with Davis County called the
Wetlands Development Agreement, by which Prows agreed to pay for the county's
acquisition of certain "Wetlands Property," including the Kerr property. (Ex. D2, at 3.)
In May 1997, Tod B. Jones and Paul E. Barker entered into a Real Estate Purchase
Contract to buy the Kerr property. (R. 87.)6 When Prows learned of Jones and Barker's
interest in the property, he notified Davis County. (R. 1154, 5-13-97 entry.) Sid Smith,
the Director of Public Works for Davis County, thought the Kerrs "may be playing
games" with Jones and Barker and suggested that Davis County "get condemnation under
way." (R. 1157, 6-30-97 entry.)
On July 28, 1997, Davis County authorized the condemnation of the Kerr property
for a "public flood control improvement." (R. 5.) On August 29, 1997, Davis County
filed this condemnation action against Zions as trustee of the Max Kerr Trust to acquire

6

Davis County claims that Jones and Barker contracted to buy the Kenproperty "after the announcement of Davis County's commitment to condemn it." (Br. of
Aplt. at 9.) There was no evidence that Davis County ever made any "announcement" of
its intention to condemn the property before Jones and Barker contracted to buy it. Davis
County cites only to the fact that the development agreements with Prows were signed
and recorded before the contract between the Kerrs and Jones and Barker was signed.
9

the Kerr property for a "permanent flood control improvement." (R. 1 .)7 Even though
Davis County knew of Jones and Barker's interest in the property, it chose not to name
them in the complaint and did not give them notice of the action. (See R. 1; 14-16; 113;
198, f 3; 1195, at 3; 1196, at 3; 1198, at 18-19; 1205, at 3-6.)8 A hearing on immediate
occupancy was held on October 21,1997. (R. 1194.) Davis County did not give Jones
and Barker notice of the hearing. (R. 17-18.) Jones and Barker learned of the
condemnation shortly before the hearing and gave Davis County's attorney written notice
of their interest in the Kerr property on October 21, 1997. (R. 277.) Davis County's
attorney did nol respond to this notice until January 12,1998, when he told Jones and
Barker that Davis County would not join them as parties and advised them to seek legal
counsel. (R. 280-81.) Jones and Barker sought an attorney and filed a motion to
intervene on April 17, 1998. (R. 83.) A hearing was held on the motion on July 21, 1998
(see R. 113, 1195), and an order granting intervention was entered on August 13, 1998
7

Davis County claims that it sought to condemn the Kerr property "as part of
a larger Farmington Preserve project." (Br. of Aplt. at 7.) The resolution for
condemnation, which Davis County cites in support of this claim, does not support it but
says that the project for which the property is being condemned is "a public flood control
improvement," not the Farmington Preserve. (R. 5.) Also, before the jury Davis County
claimed that it was not condemning the Kerr property as part of the Farmington Preserve
project but simply for a flood retention basin. (See, e.g., R. 1200, at 19-20.)
8

Davis County's claim that it "first became aware of the Jones/Barker
Contract well after it filed and served its Complaint" (Br. of Aplt. at 10), is flatly
contradicted by the record. The court expressly found, in an order approved by Davis
County, that "Interveners were not named nor served with the complaint in this matter,
though their claims on the property were known to plaintiff at the time the complaint was
filed." (See R. 198, ^ 3 (emphasis added). See also R. 1137-39, 1154-57.)
10

(R. 116). After three more hearings (R. 1196, 1197 & 1198), the trial court set this date
as the valuation date (R. 311).
In his opening statement at trial, counsel for Davis County suggested that the
county was acting as "the prudent manager" of taxpayers' money. (R. 1200, at 17.)
Defense counsel objected on the ground that Davis County was "not paying for this
property, the developer is

" (R. 1200, at 17.) Later, evidence that the developer had

agreed to pay for the condemnation was admitted without objection. (R. 1200, at 39.)
At trial, Jim Bird, the former owner of the Kerr property, testified that the property
was like all the property in the area and could have been developed. (R. 1200, at 97-98,
109-12.) Karen Nichols, an environmental engineer, explained how the property could be
developed. (R. 1200, at 128-38, 143-52.) The jury also heard expert testimony on the
value of the Kerr property from two experts. Davis County's expert, Bryce Clinger,
considered the project for which the property was being condemned as "a multi-use
development project which was going to include some wetlands mitigation [and] flood
control projects," in other words, the Prows (or Farmington Preserve) development. (R.
1201, at 328. See also R. 1201, at 329-30, 347-48.) He therefore ignored sales of
adjacent properties. Mr. Clinger concluded that the highest and best use of the property
was as low-density, rural, residential development (two houses on nearly fifteen acres) or
"urban pasture," uses that the property's zoning would not allow, and appraised the
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property at $145,000. (R. 1201, at 361, 376-77, 405.)9 The defendants' expert, J. Philip
Cook, used Davis County's definition of the project, namely, flood control. (R. 1201, at
216, 254; R. 1202, at 449-51; R. 5-6; ex. D80.) He concluded that the highest and best
use of the property was as business-park property (the use for which it was zoned). Mr.
Cook considered sales of adjacent properties and other comparable properties in the area
and concluded the property was worth $1,606,500. (R. 1201, at 264-65, 287.) The court
noted that the evidence essentially required the jury to choose between the two appraisals
(R. 1201, at 355), that is, to decide whether the Kerr property would have been developed
similar to the adjacent properties but for the condemnation (as Mr. Cook assumed), or
whether it was incapable of development as a business park, the use for which it was
zoned (as Mr. Clinger assumed). The jury returned a verdict for $1,606,500, the amount
of the defendants' appraisal. (R. 908.) Davis County has not challenged the sufficiency
of the evidence to support the verdict.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Kerr property was ideally situated in the path of development in Davis
County. It had the same development potential as all the surrounding properties, was
between two major highways with great visibility and was already zoned for business

9

Mr. Clinger conceded on cross-examination that, if he were selling the
property as a developer, he would probably not sell it for the price at which he had
appraised the property. (R. 1201, at 395-96.)
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park development. Davis County could have put a flood detention basin anywhere in the
area, but it chose the Kerr property, the only property in the area already zoned "business
park." In an effort to avoid paying business park prices for business park property, Davis
County instructed its appraiser to ignore the development that was going on all around the
Kerr property and to appraise it as if its highest and best use was "urban pasture." The
property would have had to have been down-zoned before its "highest and best" use
would even have been allowed. (R. 1201, at 405.) Davis County wanted the jury to value
the property based on what it was not. They wished the property were zoned agricultural,
had no access and could not be developed, when the evidence showed just the opposite.
The jury found the county's position unbelievable.
In an effort to overturn the jury's verdict, Davis County has had to change its
positions to suit its needs. For example, when Davis County learned of Jones and
Barker's interest in the Kerr property, it started condemnation proceedings to scare them
off. Yet now it claims it did not have to name them as parties to the lawsuit because they
did not have a legally cognizable interest in the property.
When Zions protested that Davis County was only condemning the Kerr property
to aid a private developer, Davis County insisted that it was condemning only for a flood
detention basin. Yet now it claims that the sales of adjacent properties could not be
considered in valuing the Kerr property because they were part of the project for which
the Kerr property was being condemned.
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When Davis County moved in limine for an order keeping out evidence that Prows
was paying for the condemnation, the trial court clearly said it would re-visit the issue at
trial. The evidence came in at trial without objection. Now Davis County claims that the
trial court's pretrial ruling excused it from objecting to the evidence at trial.
Despite Davis County's changing positions, the trial court's rulings were correct.
The trial court correctly determined the valuation date to be August 13, 1998, the
date the buyers of the Kerr property were made parties to this action. The buyers were
never served with process, so the presumptive statutory date could not apply as to them.
Davis County knew of their interest in the Kerr property and chose not to name them,
even though required to do so by statute. Because Davis County controlled when the
buyers became parties, it should not be heard to complain because the trial court found
the valuation date to be the date they were allowed to intervene. (Point I.)
The trial court correctly denied the county leave to file an affidavit from its
attorney. The affidavit was untimely, was largely inadmissible and did not change the
facts on which the trial court based its decision. (Point II.)
The trial court correctly admitted Mr. Cook's appraisal. The evidence at trial did
not support Davis County's claim that the value of the Kerr property was improperly
enhanced by the purpose for which the property was being condemned. Rather, the
evidence showed that the adjacent properties would have been developed regardless of
the condemnation and that the Kerr property was just as valuable as those properties
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before the condemnation. Mr. Cook properly accounted for any incidental benefit the
Prows properties received as a result of the purpose for which the Kerr property was
being condemned. It was for the jury to decide whether the condemnation enhanced the
value of the Kerr property, and the jury decided it did not. (Point III.)
The trial court did not err in allowing the jury to hear that Prows was the ultimate
source of funding for the condemnation. The evidence was relevant and came in without
objection. If there was any error in its admission, Davis County invited the error by
suggesting that it was acting as the prudent protector of tax dollars. In any event, Davis
County has not shown that it was prejudiced by any error. (Point IV.)
Finally, the trial court did not err in calculating prejudgment interest. The
applicable statute provides for prejudgment interest from the date of the order of
occupancy or the date of actual possession, whichever is earlier, and the October 31,
1997, order of occupancy was never vacated or set aside. (Point V.)

ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THE DATE OF
VALUATION AS AUGUST 13,1998.
Section 78-34-11 of Utah's eminent domain statute reads: "For the purpose of
assessing compensation and damages, the right thereto shall be deemed to have accrued at
the date of the service of summons, and its actual value at that date shall be the measure
15

of compensation for all property to be actually taken . . . . " UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-11
(1996) (emphasis added).
The legislature chose the date of service as the presumptive date of valuation
advisedly. There are constitutional limits on the legislature's ability to set a valuation
date. Utah State Rd. Comm yn v. Friberg, 687 P.2d 821, 829 (Utah 1984) (per Stewart, J.,
with Durham, J., concurring). One cannot constitutionally be deprived of property
without due process, UTAH CONST, art. I, § 7, and due process requires personal
jurisdiction over the defendant, notice and an opportunity to be heard:
Due process of law requires that the owner of any such right or interest [in
land to be condemned] should have a reasonable opportunity to be heard
upon the question of compensation before he can be deprived thereof for
public use. This is a matter of constitutional right, and not dependent upon
the will of the Legislature.
Brigham City v. Chase, 30 Utah 410, 85 P. 436, 439 (1906). See also Oregon S.L.&U.N.
Ry. Co. v. Mitchell 7 Utah 505, 27 P. 693, 693 (1891) ("the condemnation of the land by
a proceeding in which [the beneficial owners of the property] were not parties would have
been of no avail"). Service of process gives the court jurisdiction over a person and gives
the person notice of the action against him and an opportunity to defend the action. See,
e.g., Henderson v. United States, 517 U.S. 654, 672 (1996); Oklahoma Radio Assocs. v.
FDIC, 969 F.2d 940, 943 (10th Cir. 1992).
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Davis County claims that section 78-34-11 unequivocally establishes the date of
valuation as the date the summons was served. (Br. of Aplt. at 28.)10 In fact, the Utah
Supreme Court has held that section 78-34-11 only establishes a presumptive date of
valuation. Utah Dep 't ofTransp. v. Walter M. Ogden & Sons, Inc., 805 P.2d 173, 174 &
n.l (Utah 1990).11 The statute allows a date of valuation other than the date of service of
process where use of the statutory date would be unfair, see Walter M. Ogden, 805 P.2d at
175; Friberg, 687 P.2d at 828-32 (plurality opinion), or where, as here, a party claiming
an interest in the property was not served with process, Friberg, 687 P.2d at 836 (Oaks,
J., concurring); Ogden L.&I. Ry. Co. v. Jones, 51 Utah 62, 168 P. 548, 550 (1917) (date
10

The very authorities Davis County relies on belie its argument that the date
of service of the summons can be the only valuation date under Utah law. See State ex
rel Rd Comm yn v. Bettilyon 's Inc., 17 Utah 2d 135, 405 P.2d 420, 422 (1965) (the
measure of compensation is the actual value of the land "on the date the summons is
served or the land actually taken") (emphasis added), cert, denied, 382 U.S. 1010 (1966);
State ex rel. Rd. Comm 'n v. Valentine, 10 Utah 2d 132, 349 P.2d 321, 323 (1960)
(referring to "well-established principles governing fair market value assessable at the
time suit was commenced") (emphasis in original); see also UTAH R. CIV. P. 3(a) (a civil
action is commenced by filing a complaint or serving a summons).
11

Davis County cites Walter M. Ogden for the proposition that section 78-3411 was meant to provide certainty. Davis County's quotation from that case is
incomplete. What the court said in that case was, "Therefore, after the property owner
has withdrawn the funds [deposited by the condemning authority under section 78-34-9],
the condemnor is entitled to a degree of certainty regarding the taking, including the date
upon which compensation must be assessed." 805 P.2d at 175 (emphasis added). Davis
County left out the italicized portion. The defendants in this case never withdrew the
funds Davis County deposited with the court, so Walter M. Ogden does not apply. The
court in that case recognized that, where a property owner does not withdraw the
deposited funds, thereby waiving his right to challenge the valuation date, "there are a
number of possible ways to object to the presumption that the date of service of process is
the proper date of valuation." Id.
17

owner entered a general appearance); Oregon S.L.&U.N. Ry. Co. v. Mitchell 7 Utah 505,
27 P. 693, 693 (1891) (date beneficial owner became a party to the action).12
Davis County argues that making the date of valuation discretionary with the trial
court destroys the certainty of the law and "allows the landowner, aided by a trial judge,
to manipulate the date of valuation for the landowner's benefit." (Br. of Aplt. at 30.)
There are two problems with this argument-legal and factual. First, the Utah Supreme
Court has not left the valuation date up to the trial court's whim. Instead, it has
"established a high standard for rebutting the presumption" that the date of service is the
valuation date. Walter M Ogden, 805 P.2d at 175. To make "a prima facie showing that
applying the presumption of valuation as of the date of service of summons may be
unconstitutional," id. at 176, the defendant must show that "the unfairness of valuing
property as of that date [is] evident and the difference in value must not be insignificant."
Friberg, 687 P.2d at 831 (plurality opinion). The trial court correctly found that the
interveners met that burden. (R. 1198, at 38.)13
12

Davis County claims that Friberg is the only "other case in eminent domain
in the entire history of Utah" that used a date of valuation other than the date of service of
process. (Br. of Aplt. at 24.) Jones and Mitchell show that Davis County does not know
its history. (See also supra note 10.)
13

Davis County suggests that the trial court applied an incorrect legal
standard when it considered whether application of the statutory date of valuation in this
case would result in fundamental unfairness to the interveners. (See Br. of Aplt. at 3032.) Yet at the hearing on the interveners' motion to determine the valuation date, Davis
County admitted that Utah law, both before and after Friberg, suggests that the standard
is "really a fundamental fairness" standard and that "the Court's quite correct in
determining what's fundamentally fair." (R. 1198, at 29; see also R. 271-75 (arguing a
18

Second, the facts of this case showed why it would be unfair to use the
presumptive date as the date of valuation in this case. The evidence showed that, if
anyone was trying to "manipulate the date of valuation," as Davis County claims, it was
Davis County. Davis County learned that Jones and Barker had an interest in the property
shortly after they acquired that interest in May 1997. {See R. 1137-38, 1154-57.) In fact,
it was Jones and Barker's interest in the property that caused Davis County to "get
condemnation under way." (R. 1157, 6-30-97 entry.) The condemnation statute
mandates that the county name in the complaint "all owners and claimants of the
property, if known." UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-6(2) (emphasis added). The buyer under
a real estate purchase contract has the equitable interest in the property and is deemed by
law the owner of the property. See, e.g., Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244, 1254-55
(Utah 1987); Jelco, Inc. v. Third Judicial Dist. Court, 29 Utah 2d 472, 511 P.2d 739, 741
(1973). Even if Jones and Barker were not the owners of the property, at a minimum they
were "claimants of the property" by virtue of their real estate purchase contract. Cf.
Brigham City, 85 P. at 438 ("the term 'claimants' should be held to embrace any person
who has an interest in the land and whose rights will be affected by a judgment of
condemnation"). The trial court found that Davis County knew that Jones and Barker
claimed an interest in the property before it filed suit, and Davis County never denied that
fundamental fairness standard).) Davis County cannot now argue that the trial court erred
by applying a standard that Davis County agreed below was the correct standard. See,
e.g., Butler, Crockett & Walsh Dev. Corp. v. Pinecrest Pipeline Operating Co., 909 P.2d
225, 235-36 (Utah 1995) (citations omitted).
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it did. (SeeR. 113; 198, U 3; 269, If 11; 1195, at 3; 1196, at 3; 1198, at 18-19.) Yet Davis
County chose not to name Jones and Barker in the complaint or serve them with process.
(R. 1, 14-16.) When Jones and Barker learned of the hearing on the order of immediate
occupancy, they rushed to the courthouse and gave the Davis County attorney a letter
setting out their interest in the property. (R. 268, 277-78.) Davis County did nothing for
two and a half months. Then it told Jones and Barker that, if they wanted to claim any
interest in the condemnation award, they needed to "contact legal counsel" and "intervene
in the litigation" (R. 281), which they did (R. 83-94). Under the facts of this case, it was
not unfair to Davis County to value the property from the time Jones and Barker were
allowed to intervene.
Moreover, the undisputed evidence showed that the delay caused by Davis
County's refused to name Jones and Barker as parties resulted in a significant difference
in value of the property from August 1997, when the action was filed, and August 1998,
when Jones and Barker were allowed to intervene and defend the action. (R. 264, ^flf 8-9.
See also R. 1198, at 38 (noting that the interveners' evidence on this point was
"unrebutted").) Thus, the trial court did not err in concluding that the interveners had met
their burden of overcoming section 78-34-11 's presumptive valuation date.
As a general rule, both the vendor and the vendee under an executory contract for
the sale of land "have been recognized as proper and necessary parties to a proceeding to
condemn [the] land." Annotation, Rights and Liabilities of Parties to Executory Contract
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for Sale of Land Taken by Eminent Domain, 27 A.L.R.3d 572, § 2, at 579 (1969). See
also Cheatham v. Carter County, 363 F.2d 582, 585 (6th Cir. 1966) (a county instituting
condemnation proceedings against land that was subject to an executory sales contract
could not be excused from naming as defendants buyers whose interest was known to the
county and its attorneys and agents). Thus, the fact that the interveners were contract
purchasers did not excuse Davis County from naming them as parties to this action.
Davis County claims, however, that Jones and Barker did not have an interest in
the property that required them to be named or served, since their interest in the property
did not appear of record. The county cites no authority for the proposition that it only has
to name those whose interests in the properly to be condemned appear of record, and, in
fact, the statute requires the county to name all "owners and claimants of the property, if
known." UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-6(2) (emphasis added). Recording gives constructive
notice of an interest in real property, see UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-3-102(1), but the lack of
constructive notice does not excuse actual knowledge of a claimed interest in property.
See, e.g., Cheatham, 363 F.2d at 585; Massey v. Wynne, 791 S.W.2d 368, 369 (Ark.
1990).
Davis County claims that it did not have to name the interveners because their
interest in the property was contingent and the contingencies never occurred and could
not have occurred once Davis County decided to condemn the property.14 The short
14

Specifically, Davis County claims that the sale was conditioned on
"approval" of "commercial development" by a governing authority. (Br. of Aplt. at 33.)
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answer to this argument is that it is not up to Davis County to determine the rights and
liabilities of the parties to an executory real estate contract. The statutory scheme the
legislature set up requires Davis County to name everyone with a claim to the property
and let them or the court or jury sort out their respective rights to any condemnation
award. See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-34-6(2); 78-34-10(1) (the court, jury or referee must
ascertain and assess the value of each and every separate estate or interest in the property
sought to be condemned); Jelco, 511 P.2d at 741-43. Cf. Thomson v. State Highway
Comm fn, 161 A. 192,192-93 (NJ. 1932) (the buyer's failure to keep up payments under
a contract was a matter between him and the seller, of which the seller, but not the
condemnor, might take advantage; the buyer was a necessary party to a condemnation
action, and the condemnor would omit him "at its peril").
The parties under a real estate contract are always free to waive any contingencies.
See, e.g., Dellicarri v. Hirschfeld, 619 N.Y.S.2d 816, 817 (App. Div. 1994); Anderson v.

In fact, the contingencies are "Buyer obtaining to Buyer's satisfaction " certain approvals.
(R. 94, f l.a & c (italics added).) Davis County conveniently omits the italicized
language from its statement of facts. {See Br. of Aplt. at 9.) If the sale was contingent on
obtaining certain approvals "to Buyer's satisfaction" and the buyers wanted to go through
with the sale, as the buyers here clearly did, those contingencies were obviously met to
their satisfaction.
Davis County also claims that it thought the most Jones and Barker had was a
"potential unexercised option." (Br. of Aplt. at 33.) It cites no authority for the
proposition that a real estate purchase contract creates only an option. Nevertheless,
under the modem view, even the owner of an unexercised option has a right to participate
in a condemnation award. See, e.g., Spokane Sch. Dist. No. 81 v. Parzybok, 633 P.2d
1324,1327-29 (Wash. 1981).
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Brinkerhoff, 756 P.2d 95, 98 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).15 The parties to the contract in this
case never voided or abandoned the contract but have always treated it as an enforceable
agreement. {See, e.g., R. 1195, at 12-13.)
The only authority Davis County cites for its argument, State ex rel. Road
Commission v. Valentine, 10 Utah 2d 132, 349 P.2d 321 (1960), is easily distinguished.
That case involved an executory contract to enter into a ten-year lease. It did not involve
a sales contract. Although the "lease" was dated April 10, 1952, rent did not become due
until August 10, 1952, or as soon thereafter as a service station was erected on the
property and "accepted." The state brought an action to condemn the property not
knowing of the contract. Process was served on July 31, 1952, and a motion for
immediate occupancy was held on August 12, 1952. At that time, no service station had
been built, so the lease had not started to run. The fee owner of the property, who was
also an officer of the lessee, appeared at the occupancy hearing, represented by the
president of the lessee, an attorney. Neither mentioned any lease but agreed that they
would not seek any enhancement in the value of the property after the service of
summons. Three and a half years later, when the state took possession of the property,
the lessee tried to claim damages for the unexpired term of the lease, that is, "for 6 Vi
years loss of business." 349 P.2d at 323. The court held that the lessee and its principals

15

Davis County acknowledged below that Jones and Barker could still "waive
the contingencies of the contract and purchase the property which is the subject of this
proceeding." (R. 272.)
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were estopped from claiming such damages. Id. at 322. The court added: "At the time
of hearing on motion for immediate occupancy, the instrument titled a 'lease' was nothing
more than an executory contract for a lease, as yet unenforceable as a lease, and hence
non-compensable." Id. at 322-23 (footnote omitted).
By contrast, when this condemnation action was brought, the contract between the
Kerrs and Jones and Barker was an enforceable contract. It may have had contingencies,
but the parties could waive those contingencies. Moreover, in Valentine the state did not
know of the lease when it condemned the property, whereas here Davis County knew of
the interveners and their interest in the Kerr property when it brought this action and in
fact brought the action when it did to discourage Jones and Barker from completing their
purchase of the property. (See R. 1137-39, 1154-57.) Finally, the defendants in this case
did not expressly waive their right to compensation in open court, as the defendants in
Valentine did.
Instead, this case is governed by Oregon S.L.&U.N. Ry. Co. v. Mitchell, 7 Utah
505, 27 P. 693 (1891). In that case, the beneficial owners of property (under a trust deed)
were never served with process. The court held that the valuation date was the date they
became parties to the action. 27 P. at 693. Cf. Ogden L.&I. Ry. Co. v. Jones, 51 Utah 62,
168 P. 548, 550 (1917) (where an owner was never served with process, the valuation
date was the date he entered a general appearance in the case). Thus, the trial court did
not err by holding that the date of valuation was August 13, 1998, the date Jones and
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Barker were allowed to intervene (the functional equivalent of service of process on
them) and thus became parties.
Davis County claims that the date of valuation is the date the summons was served
on the "primary landowner." (Br. of Aplt. at 28.) In fact, Jones and Barker, as the
equitable owners of property being sold under a real estate contract, were the "primary"
landowners. See Butler, 740 P.2d at 1254-55. In any event, where there is more than one
owner or claimant of the property to be condemned and each is served with process, there
can be multiple dates of valuation—the dates summonses were served on each claimant.
See Walter M. Ogden, 805 P.2d at 174. The interveners filed a motion for a declaratory
judgment that, as to them, the valuation date should be the date they were allowed to
intervene in the case, since they were never served with a summons. Zions did not join in
that motion. Davis County opposed the motion in part on the grounds that it would have
"to defend against the record owner's valuation date of September 3,1997, as well as a
second valuation date." (R. 271.) At the hearing on the valuation date, the trial court
raised the possibility of two valuation dates, one for Zions and one for the interveners, but
Davis County agreed that there was "[n]othing" wrong with using the same date for both
and "urge[d]" the court to use one date. (R. 1198, at 28-29, 31.) At trial, Davis County
requested and received jury instructions giving a single valuation date. (R. 781-82, 884,
887.) It therefore cannot claim the trial court erred by using the same valuation date for
both Zions as trustee and for the interveners. See Butler, Crockett, 909 P.2d at 235-36.
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Lastly, Davis County claims that "Kerr defendant adduced evidence that Max Kenwas the '[r]eal party in interest.'" (Br. of Aplt. at 36; see also id, at 6, 11.) The
"evidence" Davis County refers to is the testimony of Maxine Kerr at the hearing on
immediate occupancy explaining the relationship between Zions Bank and her father,
Max Kerr. Ms. Kerr testified that Zions appeared as trustee because her father had had a
stroke and needed help with his financial affairs. In other words, Max Kerr was the real
party in interest of the Max Kerr Trust. Ms. Kerr never claimed that Zions or her father
was the only person claiming an interest in the Kerr property. {See R. 1194, at 68-69.)
When the issue was raised, Zions' attorney took the position that the purchasers under a
contract were "really the party in interest in a condemnation suit." (R. 1195, at 4.)

II.
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED THE COUNTY LEAVE
TO FILE MR. HESS'S AFFIDAVIT.
After the trial court denied Davis County's motion for a new trial (R. 1078), Davis
County sought leave to file the Affidavit of Gerald E. Hess, its attorney (R. 1111). Davis
County claims that it was error to deny the motion because the trial court had based the
valuation date "in large part on its assumption that Davis County believed that Jones and
Barker had a legitimate ownership interest in the Kerr Property," which was not the case,
and Davis County should have had "an opportunity to set the record straight." (Br. of
Aplt. at 47.)
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The trial court did not err for several reasons. First, Utah Rule of Civil Procedure
59(c) requires that, "[w]henever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they
shall be served with the motion." (Emphasis added.) See also JUDICIAL COUNCIL R. OF
JUDICIAL ADMIN.

4-501 (1)(A) ("All motions . . . shall be accompanied by . . . appropriate

affidavits"). Mr. Hess's proposed affidavit was served over three months after its motion
for a new trial and after the motion was denied. (See R. 967, 1078, 1111.) It was clearly
untimely under rule 59.
Second, Davis County had had ample opportunity to "set the record straight." The
issue of what Davis County knew about Jones and Barker's interest in the property was
first raised over two years before and had been raised at three separate hearings before the
trial court decided the valuation date. (R. 1195, at 3; 1196, at 3; 1198, at 18-19.) Davis
County conceded that it knew of the interveners' interest in the property before it brought
this action, and the court made an express finding to that effect (R. 198, Tf 3), which Davis
County never challenged. Davis County was bound by the admissions of its attorney.
See, e.g., Gee v. Baum, 58 Utah 445, 199 P. 680, 685 (1921). Under the circumstances, it
was not error to refuse to consider Mr. Hess's belated affidavit. See Barnard v. Sutliff,
846 P.2d 1229, 1235 (Utah 1992) (the trial court did not abuse its discretion in not
considering affidavits that proffered evidence that could have been produced at trial if the
plaintiff had exercised reasonable diligence).
Third, large portions of Mr. Hess's affidavit were inadmissible. (See R. 1141-44.)
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Finally, Mr. Hess's affidavit did not change any of the facts on which the trial
court based its ruling. As shown in point I, supra, Jones and Barker did have a legitimate
ownership interest in the Kerr property. Mr. Hess's affidavit only confirmed that Davis
County knew of Jones and Barker's interest in the Kerr property before it filed this
action.16 If Davis County did not know the precise nature of Jones and Barker's interest,
it was only because it never asked. Davis County was charged with knowledge of what it
could have learned had it asked. See, e.g., Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244, 1259
(Utah 1987); Johnson v. Higley, 1999 UT App 278,126, 989 P.2d 61, cert, denied, 994
P.2d 1271 (Utah 2000). Because Mr. Hess's affidavit would not have made any
difference to the trial court's decision on the valuation date, the trial court properly
disregarded it.

III.
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY ADMITTED THE COOK
APPRAISAL.
The defendants' expert appraiser, J. Philip Cook, testified at trial that one of the
best indicators of the value of real property is what similar properties close by are selling
16

In fact, Mr. Hess was not the only Davis County employee who knew of the
interveners' interest. The record showed that Davis County's Property Manager and its
Director of Public Works were aware of the contract practically from inception and
worked with the developer to "get condemnation under way" so as to discourage Jones
and Barker from going through with their purchase of the property. (See R. 1137-39,
1154-57.)
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for. (R. 1201, at 213-14,255, 310.) The standard for admissibility of evidence of
comparable sales under Utah law is "whether they are sufficiently similar in character,
location, and other factors which would influence value, that they meet the test of
'reasonable comparability' so they can reasonably be regarded as having probative value
as to the worth of the property in question." Salt Lake City Corp. v. Utah Wool Pulling
Co., 566 P.2d 1240, 1243 (Utah 1977) (citation omitted)). The evidence at trial showed
that the Prows properties adjacent to the Kerr property were virtually indistinguishable
from the Kerr property in their character and location. (See, e.g., R. 1201, at 254 (the
Prows properties were "directly comparable" to the Kerr property).) Therefore, Mr. Cook
used sales of these properties as three of his five comparable sales in arriving at his
opinion of the Kerr property's fair market value. (See ex. D73, at 29-35.)
Davis County argues that the trial court erred in admitting Mr. Cook's appraisal
because these sales were enhanced by the project for which the Kerr property was being
condemned. Under Utah law, "in condemnation proceedings any enhancement or
decrease in value attributable to the purpose for which the property is being condemned
shall be excluded in determining the fair market value of the property." Redevelopment
Agency of Salt Lake City v. Grutter, 734 P.2d 434, 437 (Utah 1986).17
17

The typical enhancement case is where the state announces that it is
condemning property for a freeway. After the announcement is made, land adjacent to
the freeway is sold for a gas station or hotel. That sale cannot be used to enhance the
value of the land being taken for the freeway because, but for the proposed taking of the
adjacent land for a freeway, the land would not have been worth as much. See, e.g.,
Board of County Comm 'rs of Eagle County v. Vail Assocs., Ltd., 468 P.2d 842, 847
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The burden was on Davis County to show that an otherwise comparable sale was
not comparable because the price was affected by the proposed project. City of Tucson v.
Ruelas, 508 P.2d 1174, 1176 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1973).
Davis County argues that the purpose for which the Kerr property was being
condemned enhanced the value of the surrounding Prows properties in two ways. First,
Davis County claims that the Prows properties realized benefits "from use of the nearby
Kerr Property as a flood control basin, recreational open space, ecological preserve and
for walking trails." (Br. of Aplt. at 38.) To make this argument, Davis County has to
make the Prows development the project for which the Kerr property was being
condemned. {See, e.g., Br. of Aplt. at 26 (Prows "was assisting Davis County in the
Farmington Preserve" by paying for the condemnation of the Kerr property "as part of the
larger project").) The problem with this argument is that, in the lower court, Davis
County denied that it was condemning the Kerr property to benefit a private developer but
repeatedly claimed that the project for which the property was being condemned was a

(Colo. 1970). Grutter was not a freeway case. In that case, the defendants' property was
zoned R-6, which allowed up to 25 residential units on the property. The property was
condemned as part of a redevelopment project. The master plan for the redevelopment
allowed over twice as many units on the defendants' property, which would have greatly
increased its value. The court held that evidence of the master plan was inadmissible to
increase the value of the property, because any enhancement in value was attributable to
the purpose for which the property was being condemned. See 734 P.2d at 437. Grutter
is factually distinguishable because the Kerr property was not being condemned for a
redevelopment project, nor did the condemnation of the Kerr property make the zoning of
the Kerr property more favorable. The Kerr property already had the most favorable
zoning in the area.
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flood detention basin and not the Farmington Preserve. (See, e.g., R. 1, ^j 1; 2, f 6; 48384.) In other words, "recreational open space, ecological preserve and . . . walking trails"
were not the purposes for which the Kerr property was being condemned.18
The evidence showed that the sole purpose for which the Kerr property was being
condemned was to construct a storm and flood water improvement. (Ex. D80.) Indeed,
Davis County's attorney specifically told the jury to
bear in mind [that] Davis County acquired this property for a flood retention
basin. We did not acquire it for open space. We did not acquire it as a
wetlands preserve. We did not acquire it so that a trail could go around this
area. We did not acquire it to develop it. We acquired it strictly for the sole
purpose of constructing a flood retention basin.
(R. 1200, at 19-20. See also, e.g., R. 1201, at 254, 289-90 (the project is flood control,
not wetlands mitigation or open space) (testimony of Mr. Cook).) The evidence at trial
showed that Davis County was acquiring the property for a public purpose independent of
the Prows development and that the flood detention basin would have been built even
without the Prows development. (See R. 1202, at 452.)
The only evidence that the purpose for which the Kerr property was being
condemned enhanced the value of the Prows properties was evidence that use of the Kerr
property for a flood detention basin enabled Prows to mitigate its wetlands off-site (on the

18

A second problem with the argument is that, if the Kerr property was
intended as part of the Farmington Preserve development, Mr. Kerr, as owner of the
property, had to join in the development, see UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-804; Farmington
City Ordinance 11-27-111(1) (a copy of which is included in the addendum), and Mr.
Kerr did not (R. 1200, at 40).
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Kerr property) instead of on-site. (See, e.g., R. 1201, at 319.) However, Davis County is
simply wrong when it says that "Cook refused to adjust the sale prices downward to
account for the benefits realized from use of the nearby Kerr Property as a flood control
basin . . . . " (Br. of Aplt. at 38.) Mr. Cook testified that, because Prows was able to
mitigate its wetlands off-site, he had to make a downward adjustment in the value of the
Kerr property, which he did. He concluded that, before the condemnation, the Kenproperty had six acres of wetlands that had to be mitigated offsite, at a cost of $15,000 an
acre; therefore, Mr. Cook made a downward adjustment of $90,000 ($15,000 x 6) when
comparing the Prows sales to the Kerr property. (See R. 1201, at 238-39, 260.) Thus,
Mr. Cook did not enhance the value of the Kerr property by any benefit the project may
have provided to the surrounding properties.19
Davis County claims, however, that the condemnation enhanced the value of the
Prows properties in another way, by making construction of the Shepherd Creek Parkway
possible. Davis County further claims that, because Mr. Cook based his conclusions
about the value of the Kerr property on his assumption that the parkway could be

19

On the other hand, Bryce dinger, Davis County's appraiser, improperly
decreased the value of the Kerr property by taking into account the purpose for which it
was being condemned. Mr. Clinger concluded that the property was being condemned as
part of an overall development, to provide wetlands mitigation as well as flood control (R.
1201, at 328-30, 347-48), and that its highest and best use was therefore as very lowdensity, rural residential development (two houses on nearly fifteen acres) and "urban
pasture" (R. 1201, at 361, 376-77; ex. D67, at i & 9). As a result, Mr. Clinger only
considered as comparable sales, properties (mostly on the west side of 1-15) that were
mostly zoned agricultural. (See R. 1201, at 403-04; ex. D67, at 11-13B.)
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extended to provide sufficient access to the Kerr property for development, Mr. Cook
improperly relied on the project to enhance the value of the Kerr property. Mr. Cook
testified that the parkway probably would not have been built in its current configuration
but for the master development and wetlands development agreements. (R. 1201, at
313.)20 However, Mr. Cook could not say that the parkway or some road would not have
been built on the Prows property (R. 1201, at 313), and the evidence showed that Prows
could have built a road on its property even if the Kerr property had not been condemned
and Prows had been required to mitigate its wetlands on site (R. 1200, at 151). Thus, the
jury could conclude that a street would have been built on the Prows property regardless
of the condemnation, and a Farmington City ordinance requires that proposed streets "be
extended to the boundary lines of the land to be subdivided, unless prevented by
topography or other physical conditions, or unless, in the opinion of the Planning
Commission, such extension is not desirable

20

" (Ex. P3, at 50, ^f 3(b). See also R.

The parkway in its current configuration does not extend to the Kerr
property. In fact, it ends in a cul-de-sac some 600 feet from the Kerr property. (R. 1201,
at 277-78.) However, Mr. Cook testified that the reason the parkway was not extended to
the Kerr property was that the Kerr property was going to be condemned for a flood
detention basin and therefore did not need a street, so, under Grutter and the "scope of the
project" rule of appraising, Mr. Cook could not consider the fact that the parkway did not
currently provide access to the Kerr property in arriving at his estimate of value. (R.
1201, at 247, 287. See also R. 1201, at 215-18.) The undisputed evidence at trial was
that, but for the condemnation, the parkway would have been extended to the Kerr
property. (R. 1201, at 285-87.)
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1201, at 247.)21 This ordinance had been followed in the past; the existing roads in the
area stubbed in to adjacent undeveloped properties. (See R. 1201, at 242; ex. 5bx.)
Therefore, the jury could have concluded from the evidence that, whatever the
configuration of the road providing primary access to the Farmington Preserve, the road
would have been extended to the boundaries of the Kerr property and would have
provided sufficient access to the Kerr property if the Kerr property had not been
condemned for a flood detention basin.
Moreover, Mr. Cook testified at trial that the Kerr property could have had access
even without the Prows development. He testified that Burke Lane could provide the
primary access to the Kerr property, and a crash gate on 1100 West could provide the
secondary access. (R. 1201, at 243.)22 So access to the Kerr property did not depend
either on development of the Prows properties or on the purpose of the condemnation.
In all the cases Davis County relies on, those acquiring the properties whose values
were enhanced by the condemnation knew about the public improvement for which the

21

Topography or physical conditions did not prevent extension of the
parkway to the Kerr property, and, but for the condemnation, such an extension would
have been desirable for coordination of the subdivision with the existing layout and future
development of the Kerr property. (R. 1201, at 247-48.)
22

Mr. Cook testified that Burke Lane was "pretty close" to the 1-15
interchange, which might present problems. However, he further testified that the Kerrs
had a right to use the road to develop their property. If the Utah Department of
Transportation (UDOT) did not like the location of Burke Lane, it could move the road
further north at its own expense. If UDOT decided to cut off access from Burke Lane
altogether, that would constitute a taking, requiring compensation. (See R. 1201, at 243.)
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subject property was being condemned. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369,
371-72 (1943); Board of County Comm 'rs v. VailAssocs., Ltd., 468 P.2d 842, 847 (Colo.
1970); Latham Holding Co. v. State, 209 N.E.2d 542, 544 (N.Y. 1965); State Highway
Comm n v. Lacey, 113 N.W.2d 50, 51 (S.D. 1962); Grutter, 734 P.2d at 435. Here, there
was no evidence at trial that the sales of the three Prows properties that Mr. Cook used as
comparable sales were enhanced as a result of public knowledge of the proposed
condemnation. The resolution of the Board of County Commissioners authorizing the
condemnation was not passed until July 28, 1997, five months after two of the three
comparable sales of which Davis County complains. Moreover, even though Davis
County entered into the Wetlands Development Agreement with Prows on January 13,
1997, Prows was careful not to record the agreement until February 27,1997~the day
after it closed on the sales of those two properties. (R. 497; ex. D73, at 30 & 34.)
Moreover, those sales were contracted for in January and August 1996, respectively (ex.
D73, at 31 & 35), well before Davis County entered into the Wetlands Development
Agreement. Thus, there was no evidence that, at the time of those sales, Davis County's
intention to condemn the Kerr property was a matter of public record or otherwise known
by the buyers of the Prows properties and thus no evidence that the purpose for which the
Kerr property was being condemned enhanced the sales prices of those properties.
In determining the fair market value of condemned property, the jury may consider
"all factors bearing upon such value that any prudent purchaser would take into account
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. . . , including any potential development in the area reasonably to be expected. " State
ex rel. Rd. Comm yn v. Woolley, 15 Utah 2d 248, 390 P.2d 860, 863 (1964) (emphasis
added and citation omitted), repudiated on other grounds by Grutter, 734 P.2d 434 (Utah
1986). The evidence at trial showed that, before condemnation, the Kerr property was as
well suited for development as the surrounding properties, if not better suited. It had a
higher zoning classification and already had a sewer line and sewer connections. The
surrounding, comparable properties were sold for development within about eighteen
months of the valuation date. They were therefore relevant evidence of the fair market
value of the Kerr property. Cf. id. at 862 ("it would have been error for the court to
exclude evidence of prices paid for comparable property") (footnote omitted).23
The evidence at trial also showed that the Prows properties could have been
developed even if the Kerr property had not been condemned for a flood detention basin.
Prows could have developed its properties without a flood detention basin on the Kenproperty. (See, e.g., R. 1200, at 149-52.) Thus, the development of the Prows properties
did not depend on the purpose for which the Kerr property was being condemned.

23

Evidence of the sales of the Prows properties was admissible not just to
show the value of the Kerr property. It was also admissible to show the highest and best
use of the Kerr property. Where, as here, the property to be condemned is virtually
indistinguishable from adjacent properties and the adjacent properties are being sold for
commercial and residential development, that evidence is relevant to show that the
highest and best use of the subject property is also commercial and residential
development.
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In short, the evidence at trial did not support Davis County's claim that the
purpose for which the Kerr property was being condemned enhanced its value. Rather,
the evidence showed that the Kerr property was ideally situated in an area whose time for
development had come. In any event, because there was evidence from which the jury
could determine that the Prows properties would have been developed and sold even if
Davis County had not condemned the Kerr property, it was up to the jury to decide the
extent, if any, to which the condemnation enhanced the value of the Prows properties
(and, indirectly, the Kerr property).
A trial court does not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of other sales
when there is a valid question of fact as to whether the proposed project influenced the
sales. City of Tucson v. Ruelas, 508 P.2d 1174,1176 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1973). "In such
instances whether the sales were affected or not is a question for the jury under proper
instructions by the court." Id.
The trial court instructed the jury that it could "not consider any enhancement or
decrease in property values generally which may occur and which are attributable to the
purpose for which the property is being condemned." (R. 889).24 Such an instruction
reduced the "likelihood that error resulted from the . . . introduction of comparable sales."
Board of County Comm 'rs of Garfield County v. Tenbrook, 491 P.2d 597, 599 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1971).
24

The instruction was requested by Davis County (R. 784) and was taken
from MODEL UTAH JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL 16.10 (1993).
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The jury is presumed to have followed the court's instructions. See, e.g., Dejavue,
Inc. v. U.S. Energy Corp., 1999 UT App 355, % 16, 993 P.2d 222 (citation omitted), affd,
4 P.3d 1289 (Utah 2000). The jury implicitly found that the purpose for which the Kerr
property was being condemned did not indirectly enhance the value of the Kerr property
by inflating the value of the surrounding Prows properties but must have concluded that
the Prows properties sold for the amounts they sold for because the area was ready to be
developed, regardless of the county's condemnation of the Kerr property for a flood
detention basin.
In short, the jury heard and considered all of Davis County's arguments as to why
the Kerr property would have been worth less than Mr. Cook opined were it not for the
condemnation, and it rejected all those arguments, as was its prerogative. "[I]f error was
committed, it was not prejudicial, the jury having the benefit of the bases for both parties'
opinions as to value." Woolley, 390 P.2d at 862.25
The doctrine of enhancement was meant to prevent the condemnee from receiving
a windfall as a result of the condemnation. "Just compensation" requires that the
condemnee receive the fair market value of his property valued as if the condemnation
had not occurred. E.g., Utah State Rd. Comm 'n v. Friberg, 687 P.2d 821, 828 (Utah
25

Before trial, Davis County admitted that the proper way of dealing with the
defendants' appraisal was through cross-examination: "They have the opportunity to
present that [appraisal] to the trier of fact and the trier of fact then, and through cross
examination,... I think that there is adequate opportunity to present to the trier of fact
fair and impartial information upon which the jury can make a fair and impartial
determination." (R. 1199, at 31.)
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1984). If there had not been any condemnation, the Kerr property would have been worth
just as much as the Prows properties, if not more. All the properties were in the same
general area, had the same physical characteristics and had the same potential for
development. The Kerr property had the added advantages of being zoned "business
park" and having excellent freeway visibility. The jury could easily have concluded from
the evidence that, but for the condemnation, the Kerr property would have been
developed just as the surrounding properties were and that all would have had essentially
the same value.
Davis County's argument stands the doctrine of enhancement on its head. Davis
County's condemnation of the Kerr property for a flood detention basin did not enhance
the value of the Kerr property; it decreased its value, as shown by Davis County's
appraisal. Davis County would have had the jury believe that the Kerr property was
worth only $8,000 to $12,000 an acre, while property right next door to it was selling for
over $100,000 an acre at about the same time. In other words, Davis County would have
had the jury believe that, by stepping across an imaginary line on the ground, property
values decreased by 1000 percent, simply because property on one side of the line could
not be commercially developed because it was going to be condemned as a flood
detention basin. If anyone violated the Grutter principle, it was Davis County's appraiser
and not Mr. Cook.
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Even if Mr. Cook had somehow erred in considering the sale of the adjacent Prows
properties in valuing the Kerr property, any error was harmless. Davis County does not
claim (nor was there any evidence) that the sales of the other two properties Mr. Cook
used as comparable sales were enhanced by the condemnation. The average adjusted
value of those two sales was $2.35 a square foot, or $102,366 per acre (see ex. D73, at
45), which is within about 6 percent of what Mr. Cook concluded was the value of the
Kerr property ($2.50 per square foot, or $108,900 per acre), suggesting that the
condemnation of the Kerr property did not inflate property values in the area. Moreover,
one of those parcels was closest in size to the Kerr property and sold for almost the same
price per acre as the Kerr property's appraised value and the value the jury found. (See
ex. D73, at 38.) Thus, the jury's verdict was supported by the admissible evidence, even
if evidence of the Prows sales were somehow inadmissible.

IV.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR BY ADMITTING EVIDENCE THAT
PROWS WOULD PAY THE CONDEMNATION AWARD.
Davis County claims that the jury's verdict was rendered under the influence of
prejudicial and irrelevant evidence that Prows would pay the amount of the condemnation
award.
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Davis County has not cited any trial testimony to the effect that Prows was going
to pay the condemnation award. (See Br. of Aplt. at 19, 41-45.) All it has cited is
statements of counsel, which are not evidence and were not objected to.26
A.

Davis County Waived Any Objection to Evidence That Prows Was Paying for
the Condemnation.
Davis County claims it was not required to object because, before trial, it moved in

limine to exclude evidence that Prows was the ultimate source for funding any judgment,
(R. 380-81), and the court denied its motion (R. 599, f 4). However, that ruling did not
preclude Davis County or the court from revisiting the issue at trial. See, e.g., UTAH R.
CIV. P. 54(b); Erickson v. Wasatch Manor, Inc., 802 P.2d 1323, 1325-26 (Utah Ct. App.
1990). The trial court stated that it was "going to deny that motion" (R. 1199, at 59), but
instructed the parties in no uncertain terms that "[a] denial of a motion in limine doesn't
mean to me that it can't be raised at trial" (R. 1199, at 58). The court continued:
When I deny something, that means I'll look at it when the evidence comes
in, but I'm not going to say that that's going to be excluded, that they can't
do it. However, I guess it's with anything that I say is if you want to make
26

Davis County also claims that "the defense portrayed [Prows] as a wealthy
developer." (Br. of Aplt. at 19.) The only evidence that was introduced of Prows's
wealth at trial was the fact that it sold lands adjacent to the Kerr property for about $9
million. (R. 1201, at 320.) This evidence was admissible as evidence of comparable
sales. (See supra pt. III.) As Davis County pointed out to the jury, there was no evidence
of how much Prows put in to developing his property, and Davis County itself elicited
evidence of what Prows originally bought the property for (some $2 million). (R. 1202,
at 459.) Thus, Davis County cannot complain if the jury drew the conclusion that Prows
was a wealthy developer. As the trial court noted, any mitigating factors could have been
brought out on cross-examination, and, if Prows did not get $9 million from the sales of
its properties, "why didn't somebody from [the] company testify?" (R. 1204, at 52-53.)
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something in an opening statement and then it doesn't get in, you know,
that's up to you because until I hear more . . . .
(R. 1199, at 60.) The court further explained to the defendants:
Whatever is going to come in is going to come in at your own risk.... I'm
not allowing them to exclude that Mr. Prows has nothing to do with this, but
I'm not going to necessarily say that you have carte-blanche authority to
bring in anything. You can put it on and, you know, I'll hear it as the
testimony comes in. So I don't know if that should be a denial. I guess that
should be probably a denial.

. . . [Davis County's motion to exclude evidence] of developer being
involved is going to be denied and it can be brought up during the trial....
(R. 1199, at 61 (emphasis added).)27
Davis County argues that the trial court's written order denying its motion in
limine controls over the court's statements at the hearing. However, it is well established
that a trial court's oral ruling may be used to interpret and explain a written order when
the two are not inconsistent. See, e.g., Crisp v. Mayabb, 668 F.2d 1127, 1135 (10th Cir.
1981), cert denied, 459 U.S. 827 (1982); St. Pierre v. Director of Revenue, 39 S.W.3d
576, 578 n.5 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001). When a court denies a motion in limine to exclude
evidence, it may mean that the court will allow the evidence to come in at trial or that the
court will decide when the evidence is offered at trial. See, e.g., Erickson, 802 P.2d at

27

At the hearing on Davis County's motion for a new trial, the trial judge
reiterated that his ruling on the motion in limine was not a definitive ruling admitting the
evidence and stated that he was "surprised as could be" and "amazed"when the evidence
came in at trial without objection. (See R. 1204, at 36-37, 39-40, 42-43, 44-46, 87.)
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1325-26. See also Billings v. Nielson, 738 P.2d 1047, 1048 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). The
trial court's oral ruling was competent to explain its written order and shows that Davis
County was required to object to the evidence at trial.
Despite the trial court's ruling that, in denying Davis County's motion in limine to
exclude evidence that Prows was paying for the condemnation, the trial court was not
excusing Davis County from objecting to the evidence at trial, the Wetlands Development
Agreement, which spells out Prows's obligation to pay for the condemnation {see ex. D2,
at 3,1fl[ 1.1 & 1.1.2), came in at trial without objection. (R. 1200, at 39.)
B.

Davis County Invited Any Error.
If there was error (and there was not), Davis County invited it. Reference to Prows

as the source of payment for the condemnation award came in only after Davis County
opened the door to such evidence.
In his opening statement, Davis County's attorney appealed to the jurors' selfinterest by implying that Davis County was trying to keep taxes low: "Now Davis
County being the prudent manager of the County's tax money has, has gone together, or
excuse me, recognizing the benefit of managing the tax dollars prudently took
opportunity as was mentioned by counsel for the defendants . . . . " (R. 1200, at 17.) Only
then did defense counsel object, as was his obligation to do: "Judge I'm, I've got to
object on argument on a prudent manager. They are not paying for this property, the
developer is and I believe that's a totally improper argument." (R. 1200, at 17.)
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Where the condemning authority is the first to raise the issue, it is not error for the
landowner to introduce evidence or argue that any condemnation award will not come out
of taxpayers' pockets. See State v. Barnhill, 196 So.2d 691, 696 (Ala. 1967) (argument to
the effect that the federal government was going to pay the biggest part of the
condemnation award was not reversible error where it was provoked by the improper
argument of counsel for the state appealing to the jurors' self-interest as taxpayers); St.
Clair County v. Bukacek, 131 So.2d 683, 691 (Ala. 1961) (statements or arguments of
counsel that are provoked or produced by statements or arguments of opposing counsel to
the effect that a condemnation award would come out of taxpayers' pockets can furnish
no ground for complaint or corrective action); Perry v. Iowa State Highway Comm fn, 180
N.W.2d 417, 422-23 (Iowa 1970) (where the condemnor first made reference to the
source of funds for an award, it could not complain of the condemnee's argument or
evidence regarding the source of funds). Cf. People ex rel. Dep 't of Pub. Works v.
Graziadiof 42 Cal. Rptr. 29, 33-34 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1964) (appeal to the self-interest
of the jury was improper); Camp v. Commissioners' Court of El Paso County, 279
S.W.2d 927, 928 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955) (argument of counsel for the county to the effect
that the taxpayers would pay for the land condemned was "highly improper").
The court instructed the jury that the statements of the lawyers made during the
trial are not evidence and should not be considered in arriving at a verdict. (R. 872.)
Jurors are presumed to follow the instructions. See, e.g., Dejavue, Inc. v. U.S. Energy

44

Corp., 1999 Utah Ct. App. 355, f 16, 993 P.2d 222 (citation omitted), aff'd, 4 P.3d 1289
(Utah 2000). Where, as here, "the court's instructions included an admonition that the
statements of counsel are not to be regarded as evidence," allegedly improper statements
of counsel "could not properly be regarded as reversible" error. Salt Lake County v.
Kazura, 22 Utah 2d 313, 452 P.2d 869, 871 (1969).
C.

The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Allowing the Jury to Hear
That Prows Was the Source of Funding for the Condemnation.
Utah law favors informed juries. The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that

juries should not be kept in the dark about the effects of their decisions or about
agreements that may give parties an incentive to collude or that may affect their
credibility. See Slusher v. Ospital, 111 P.2d 437, 444 (Utah 1989); Dixon v. Stewart, 658
P.2d 591, 596-97 (Utah 1982). The Utah Supreme Court has also recognized that jurors
naturally assume that condemnation awards come from taxpayer dollars, Utah State Rd.
Comm yn v. Marriott, 21 Utah 2d 238, 444 P.2d 57, 59 (1968), and that, where jurors are
also taxpayers and where they believe that any award is going to come from tax dollars,
they have a natural "incentive to keep their taxes, and consequently any damage award,
low," Durham v. Duchesne County, 893 P.2d 581, 583 (Utah 1995). For these reasons,
the jury was entitled to know the ultimate funding source of any condemnation award.
Cf. State ex rel Rd. Comm n v. Woolley, 15 Utah 2d 248, 390 P.2d 860, 862 (1964) (it
was not reversible error to admit evidence of federal funding of a highway project).
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D.

Any Error Was Not Prejudicial.
Even if the trial court had somehow erred by letting the jury hear that Prows was

obligated to pay for the condemnation award and even if Davis County had properly
objected to that evidence, that would not entitle Davis County to a new trial. See UTAH R.
EVID.

103(a) (error may not be predicated on the admission of evidence "unless a

substantial right of the party is affected"). An error that does not undermine confidence
in the jury's verdict is harmless. Tingey v. Christensen, 1999 UT 68, <[j 16, 987 P.2d 588.
The amount of the verdict is ordinarily left to the exclusive province of the jury, and the
court may not interfere with the jury's verdict unless it clearly appears that the award was
rendered under a misunderstanding or disregard of the law or the evidence or where the
award is obviously above any reasonable appraisal of damages such that it can be
accounted for only by the presence of passion or prejudice. See, e.g., Rufv. Association
for World Travel Exch., 10 Utah 2d 249, 351 P.2d 623, 623 (1960); Paul v. Kirkendall, 1
Utah 2d 1, 261 P.2d 670, 671 (1953). This is not such a case.
The jury was presented with two appraisals, one for $145,000 and one for
$1,606,500. The jury awarded the latter amount. This amount was strongly supported by
Mr. Cook's appraisal and was based on sales of the most comparable propertiesproperties in close proximity to the Kerr property. (The admissibility of the Cook
appraisal is addressed in point III, supra.) Davis County's appraisal ignored every piece
of property near the subject property and proposed a use for it that was not even allowed
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by its zoning. (R. 1201, at 405.) The court must assume that the jury weighed the
evidence in light of the court's instructions and rendered a just award. Graziadio, 42 Cal.
Rptr. at 34. Indeed, Davis County conceded below that it was not claiming that the
verdict was excessive or the result of prejudice. (R. 1204, at 2, 48.)
This case is similar to Weber Basin Water Conservancy District v. Skeen, 8 Utah
2d 79, 328 P.2d 730 (1958). The jury in that case awarded the defendants $80,000 in a
condemnation action. The plaintiff contended that the award was excessive, influenced
by passion and prejudice, based on comments by certain jurors. The court noted that the
amount awarded was about what the defendants' expert had estimated the value of the
property to be. The court stated:
The jury had the benefit of opinions from three qualified experts as
to the value of the land. Although these opinions varied considerably it is
within the prerogative of the jury to believe whom it chooses, and it chose
to believe defendants' expert rather than plaintiffs....
When a jury verdict is supported by competent evidence, as was here
the case, it is generally left unaltered by this court. In this case the alleged
passion and prejudice which could alter this rule has not been demonstrated.
Despite plaintiffs attempt to show the jury's hostile attitude it remains that
the award was within the estimate of value given by one of the expert
witnesses and being thus supported by competent evidence, is entitled to the
recognition and affirmation of this court. The fact that the jury chose to
render its verdict in harmony with the highest of the available valuations is
not in itself cause for reversal
328 P.2d at 731 (footnotes omitted and emphasis added).
Had the jury been sufficiently inflamed to award excessive damages, it would have
awarded more than the appraised value of the land. Because the jury only awarded the
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fair market value of the land, as established by a fair and competent appraisal that took
into consideration the value of the lands most comparable to the Kerr property, there is no
evidence that the jury's verdict was improperly influenced by passion or prejudice.

V.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN CALCULATING
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST.
Davis County claims that the trial court erred by allowing prejudgment interest
from October 31, 1997, the date of the order of occupancy.
The governing statute provides that the judgment in a condemnation action
shall include, as part of the just compensation awarded, interest at the rate
of 8% per annum on the amount finally awarded as the value of the property
. . . , from the date of taking actual possession of the property by the
plaintiff or from the date of the order of occupancy, whichever is earlier, to
the date of judgment.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-34-9(5)(c)(i) (Supp. 2000).

The order of occupancy in this case was entered October 31, 1997. Davis County
claims that the trial court "effectively struck" this order (Br. of Aplt. at 46), so
prejudgment interest should have run from March 8, 1999, the date of the stipulation
entitling Davis County to immediate occupancy. However, the October 31,1997, order
was never set aside but remained effective as to Zions.
The fact that the trial court allowed the interveners to challenge Davis County's
right to immediate occupancy does not justify ignoring the statutory date for determining
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when interest begins to accrue. An order of immediate occupancy is interlocutory in
nature. See Utah State Rd. Comm fn v. Friberg, 687 P.2d 821, 833 (Utah 1984). If the
county's right to condemn is challenged, it can finally be determined only after a trial on
the merits. Id. Because the interveners were not parties at the time of the first hearing on
occupancy, they could have waited until trial to challenge Davis County's right to
condemn the property. See id. Yet, under the statute, prejudgment interest would still
have run from October 31, 1997, the date of the order of occupancy. In other words, the
legislature saw fit to allow interest from the date of the order of occupancy (or the date of
possession, whichever is earlier), even though an order of occupancy does not finally fix
the condemning authority's right to possession of the property. Although an additional
order of occupancy was later entered as to the interveners, it did not replace the original
order of occupancy.
Even if the trial court could have properly ignored the order of occupancy, that still
does not mean that prejudgment interest should have run from Davis County's proposed
alternative date (March 8, 1999). That date is not a recognized date under the statute, and
there was evidence that Davis County took actual possession of the property shortly after
October 31, 1997, if not before. (See R. 909-10, 931, 940-41, 1203, at 1.) In fact, Davis
County admitted below that it "took possession of the property and moved onto the same
to perform preliminary work necessary to allow it to build its flood control facility"
"[i]mmediately" following entry of the order of immediate occupancy in October 1997.
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(R. 271.) Thus, the trial court did not err in rejecting Davis County's objection to the
proposed judgment.

CONCLUSION
The trial court committed no reversible error. This court should therefore affirm
its judgment.
DATED this 6 1 ^ day of August, 2001.
DEWSNUP, KING & OLSEN

David R. Olsen
Paul M. Simmons
Douglas H. Patton

(Original signature)
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ADDENDUM
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Utah Code Ann. (1996)
78-34-6. Complaint — Contents.
The complaint must contain:
(1) the name of the corporation, association, commission or person in charge of the
public use for which the property is sought, who must be styled plaintiff.
(2) the names of all owners and claimants of the property, if known, or a statement
that they are unknown, who must be styled defendants.
(3) a statement of the right of the plaintiff.
(4) if a right of way is sought, the complaint must show its location, general route
and termini, and must be accompanied by a map thereof, so far as the same is involved in
the action or proceeding.
(5) a description of each piece of land sought to be taken, and whether the same
includes the whole or only part of an entire parcel or tract. All parcels lying in the county
and required for the same public use may be included in the same or separate
proceedings, at the option of the plaintiff, but the court may consolidate or separate them
to suit the convenience of parties.
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Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 2000)
78-34-9.

Occupancy of premises pending action — Deposit paid into court
— Procedure for payment of compensation.

(1) At any time after the commencement of suit, and after giving notice to the
defendant as provided in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the plaintiff may file a
motion with the court requesting an order permitting the plaintiff to:
(a) occupy the premises sought to be condemned pending the action, including appeal;
and
(b) to do whatever work on the premises that is required.
(2) The court shall:
(a) take proof by affidavit or otherwise of:
(i) the value of the premises sought to be condemned;
(ii) the damages that will accrue from the condemnation; and
(iii) the reasons for requiring a speedy occupation; and
(b) grant or refuse the motion according to the equity of the case and the relative
damages that may accrue to the parties.
(3) (a) If the motion is granted, the court shall enter its order requiring that the
plaintiff, as a condition precedent to occupancy, file with the clerk of the court a sum
equal to the condemning authority's appraised valuation of the property sought to be
condemned.
(b) That amount shall be for the purposes of the motion only and is not admissible in
evidence on final hearing.
(4) (a) Upon the filing of the petition for immediate occupancy, the court shall fix the
time within which, and the terms upon which, the parties in possession are required to
surrender possession to the plaintiff.
(b) The court may issue orders governing encumbrances, liens, rents, assessments,
insurance, and other charges, if any, as required.
(5) (a) The rights of just compensation for the land taken as authorized by this section
or damaged as a result of that taking vests in the parties entitled to it.
(b) That compensation shall be ascertained and awarded as provided in Section
78-34-10.
(c) (i) Except as provided in Subsection (5)(c)(ii), judgment shall include, as part of
the just compensation awarded, interest at the rate of 8% per annum on the amount finally
awarded as the value of the property and damages, from the date of taking actual
possession of the property by the plaintiff or from the date of the order of occupancy,
whichever is earlier, to the date of judgment.
(ii) The court may not award interest on the amount of the judgment that was paid into
court.
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(6) (a) Upon the application of the parties in interest, the court shall order that the
money deposited in the court be paid before judgment as an advance on the just
compensation to be awarded in the proceeding.
(b) This advance payment to a defendant shall be considered to be an abandonment by
the defendant of all defenses except a claim for greater compensation.
(c) If the compensation finally awarded exceeds the advance, the court shall enter
judgment against the plaintiff for the amount of the deficiency.
(d) If the advance received by the defendant is greater than the amount finally
awarded, the court shall enter judgment against the defendant for the amount of the
excess.
(7) Arbitration of a dispute under Section 78-34-21 or Section 63-34-13 is not a bar or
cause to stay the action for occupancy of premises authorized by this section.
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Utah Code Ann. (1996)
78-34-11. When right to damages deemed to have accrued.
For the purpose of assessing compensation and damages, the right thereto shall be
deemed to have accrued at the date of the service of summons, and its actual value at that
date shall be the measure of compensation for all property to be actually taken, and the
basis of damages to property not actually taken, but injuriously affected, in all cases
where such damages are allowed, as provided in Section 78-34-10. No improvements put
upon the property subsequent to the date of service of summons shall be included in the
assessment of compensation or damages.
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Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment.
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be granted to all or any of the
parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of the following causes; provided, however, that
on a motion for a new trial in an action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if
one has been entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of law or
make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new judgment:
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, or any order of the court, or
abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented from having a fair trial.
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors have been induced to
assent to any general or special verdict, or to a finding on any question submitted to them by the
court, by resort to a determination by chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be
proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors.
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against.
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application, which he could
not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial.
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given under the influence of
passion or prejudice.
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or that it is against law.
(7) Error in law.
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later than 10 days after the
entry of the judgment.
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is made under Subdivision
(a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affidavit. Whenever a motion for a new trial is
based upon affidavits they shall be served with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after
such service within which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affidavits or
opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional period not exceeding 20
days either by the court for good cause shown or by the parties by written stipulation. The court
may permit reply affidavits.
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment the court of its own
initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it might have granted a new trial on
motion of a party, and in the order shall specify the grounds therefor.
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the judgment shall be
served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment.
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